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Crowdsourced and crowdfunded: The future of forensic DNA? 
Forensic DNA analysis is dependent on comparing the known and the unknown. 
Expand the number of known profiles, and the likelihood of a successful match 
increases. Forensic use of DNA is moving towards comparing samples of 
unknown origin with publicly available genetic data, such as the records held by 
genetic genealogy providers. Use of forensic genetic genealogy has yielded a 
number of recent high-profile successes but has raised ethical and privacy 
concerns. Navigating family trees is complex, even more so when combined with 
a comparison of genetic relationships. This intelligence-gathering process has led 
to occasional false leads, and its use also risks a public backlash, similar to 
concerns over Cambridge Analytica. A cautious approach to use of this technique 
is therefore warranted. 
Keywords: forensic genetic genealogy, privacy, familial DNA, forensic DNA 
analysis 
 
“Data! Data! Data!” he cried impatiently. “I can’t make bricks without clay.” 
   - Sherlock Holmes (A. C. Doyle, The Adventures of Sherlock Holmes, 1892) 
 
Forensic DNA analysis has, for 30 years, provided an invaluable tool for law 
enforcement. The ability to compare DNA from a crime scene with a suspect, or the 
DNA from recovered human remains with that of a close family member, has 
revolutionised forensic science 1. Traditional forensic DNA analysis is dependent on the 
match – the known and the unknown.  Expand the number of known profiles, and the 
likelihood of a match with an unknown increases.   
As law enforcement moves beyond its own data holdings to publicly available 
genetic information, this is where forensic use of DNA has entered a larger discussion 
around ‘Big Data’ 2. We have entered an era where there is a significant repository of 
publicly-accessible genetic data. The usefulness of these data is further increased by 
family links and the ability to overlay family genealogy records. Some commentators 
have compared this DNA data mining potential to the ethical issues raised by the recent 
trawling of Facebook data by political consulting firm Cambridge Analytica 3.   
Suspect identification 
 
When Joseph James DeAngelo was arrested in California in April 2018 over a series of 
30-year-old murders and assaults, attention quickly focused on how the suspect was 
found. In their search for the so-called ‘Golden State Killer’, police searched a public 
database that people use to compare sections of DNA with other individuals. This 
approach reportedly took months, involved police and consultant genealogists tracing 
records back to the suspect’s great-great-great grandparents, and then building 25 
family trees forward to the present day, eventually narrowing in on a single suspect 4-6. 
However - as anyone who has attempted to trace their family tree would know – 
such a process is not for the faint-hearted. It is complex and difficult, prone to error and 
misinterpretation. Family trees have been described as more like ‘entangled meshes’ 7. 
The use of public genealogy records adds an extra dimension to familial DNA 
matching, a technique used as early as 2003 in the United Kingdom and which attracted 
public attention in the ‘Grim Sleeper’ case in California in 2010. In that case, police had 
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a partial match to a DNA profile in a law enforcement database, identifying an 
immediate family member as the suspect 8, 9.   
The potential to traverse genetic profiles from a cross-section of the population 
certainly recasts some of the criticism of familial DNA matching as being restricted to 
law enforcement databases which – for socio-economic reasons – generally have a 
higher representation from minority groups 10. Forensic genetic genealogy, with its 
reliance on fee-for-service analysis, potentially skews in the opposite direction – 
towards families with a higher disposable income. 
Identifying human remains 
 
Marcia King was murdered in 1981 before the advent of forensic DNA analysis. Her 
unidentified body was buried in a ‘Jane Doe’ grave, with only exhibits – including a 
vial of blood – retained by police. Over nearly four decades investigators exhausted all 
leads in attempting to identify the ‘Buck Skin Girl’, named for the type of jacket she 
was wearing when found dumped near a road in Ohio in the United States. Police had 
successfully developed a DNA profile for her but there was no match with law 
enforcement or missing person DNA holdings 11. 
 In 2018, the DNA Doe Project – a charity group formed in 2017 to apply 
forensic genetic genealogy to unsolved missing person cases – agreed to work with law 
enforcement on the case. Applying a ‘crowd-funding’ approach, where the team 
appealed for public donations, the charity funded whole genome sequencing of a sample 
from the remaining blood. While the genetic analysis was only partially successful, it 
produced significant amounts of genetic data consistent with the markers used by direct-
to-consumer genetic providers. 
 The project team uploaded and compared the genetic data with publicly 
accessible genetic profiles and identified an individual who was a possible first cousin, 
once removed. Then, by searching that cousin’s own shared family tree through a major 
genealogical website, they came to a presumptive identification – that cousin had 
flagged a relative in their family tree as ‘Death-Unknown Missing-Presumed Dead’ 11.  
  In a matter of hours, genealogists had provided a solid lead in a 37-year-
old case which, with confirmatory DNA testing, led to the identification of the victim as 
Marcia King. 
There are more than 500 unidentified human remains in Australia today 12. 
Given the success of the DNA Doe Project’s team of expert genealogists to date, 
applying such an approach could help bring closure to missing persons’ families. 
Where things can go wrong 
 
Law enforcement use of genealogical and DNA databases has not always yielded such 
results. In 1996, Angie Dodge was murdered in Idaho in the United States. DNA, 
believed to be from the suspect, was recovered from the crime scene. Nearly 20 years 
later, police obtained a warrant to search a specific database managed by genealogy 
provider AncestryDNA. This search yielded 41 partial matches, with one individual 
matching at 34 out of 35 Y-STR markers. Using a similar forensic genealogy approach, 
investigators reviewed close family members of that individual and settled on Michael 
Usry, Jr. as a suspect. Mr Usry, who later provided a DNA sample and was excluded as 
a suspect, was a young adult at the time of the murder and, coincidentally, had 
vacationed in Idaho around that time 13, 14. 
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While forensic genealogy is a useful intelligence tool, there are consequences for 
individuals if the tool incorrectly identifies a suspect. Mr Usry notes that it took a month 
to conduct the required DNA testing to clear his name. Online search engines still return 
a high number of results linking his name to the murder investigation 14. While most of 
these links make it clear he was excluded as a suspect through further DNA testing, one 
asks ‘Do you think Michael Usry Jr. could be involved in Angie’s murder?’. 
 
Will people be put off genetic testing? 
 
The potential for online genetic databases to be used to assist law enforcement is ever 
increasing. In each of the above cases, investigators uploaded some form of genetic 
data, of unknown origin, to a public database. This could amount to a breach of a 
provider’s terms and conditions, but there may be little the company can do to prevent 
such use 15. The direct-to-consumer testing market is expected to more than triple by 
2022, to $A388 million. In 2017, AncestryDNA - the largest of the providers - 
reportedly sold 1.5 million testing kits over the ‘Black Friday’ sales weekend alone 16. 
But use of forensic genealogy also has the potential to undermine consumer trust 
in genetic testing and online genealogy. Genetic providers may be more susceptible to 
consumer backlash about privacy concerns than social media companies such as 
Facebook which has continued to grow in spite of recent privacy concerns 17.  Many 
users do not find the need to engage with genetic providers on an ongoing basis, like 
they do with Facebook. After initial testing, users wishing to minimise privacy risks 
could potentially download their data and then delete their accounts, limiting further use 
of their data. 
Genetic providers are also limited in their ability to implement privacy 
safeguards, such as identity verification, due to the very nature of their products. 
Individuals may legitimately use the tool without knowing their true birth name or 
names of family members.  
We should proceed with caution 
 
Forensic genetic genealogy is one example of a trend in the intelligence value of 
publicly accessible data. A coroner in Ada Country in the United States noted that social 
media was also being used more frequently to assist in identification: ‘Facebook is not 
something we thought we’d be using to find next of kin...We use it every single week’ 
18. 
 Publicly accessible data can even predict family relationships. Data scientists 
recently used next of kin volunteered by two million patients to assemble 223,000 
family trees, the largest containing 100 relatives 19, 20. 
The question of law enforcement use of social media has been raised in criminal 
cases in the United States. In USA v. Daniel Gatson, et al. the US District Court in New 
Jersey ruled that law enforcement could create fake social media accounts to entice 
suspects to engage with them online. However, the judgement specifically notes that the 
defendant consented to this by accepting the online friend request. Consent for use of 
online genealogical databases is broader, but arguably consent has been given for a 
narrow purpose 21. 
In Arquiette v. United States of America et al, a US District Court case that was 
ultimately settled, an individual sued the United States Drug Enforcement 
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Administration (DEA) after it used her seized phone to create a fake social media 
account in her name. In that case, a copy of a letter from the social media platform to 
the DEA was publicly released informing them it had terminated the fake account and 
demanding that the DEA stop using any other fake accounts on its platform. The 
provider claimed that such profiles would ‘threaten the integrity of [the Facebook] 
community’ and that this would make users ‘feel less safe and secure when using our 
service’. 
Courts have continued to grapple with technological change and the impact of 
exploitation by law enforcement on individual rights and expectations of privacy 22, 23. 
Similar arguments may arise with forensic genealogy. Courts may need to balance the 
benefits to society of solving crime with whether the user has given implied consent, 
both for themselves and their relatives. 
Privacy legislation may also play a part. Europe and Australia, amongst many 
other countries, have strong privacy protections 24-26. It is possible that privacy 
regulators may take an interest in this approach, although the regulatory focus tends to 
be on the holder of the personal information - in this case, the direct-to-consumer 
providers themselves. The application of specific health privacy laws, such as the 
United States HIPAA Privacy Rule, to DNA databases is less clear 27. 
However, law enforcement is also holding genetic information. In almost all 
cases, a crime scene sample subjected to forensic genetic genealogy would be from an 
unknown source. If law enforcement already had a suspicion as to the identity of the 
donor, then uploading that genetic information to a public database could well amount 
to a breach of that individual’s right to privacy over their genetic information.  
For a sample of unknown origin, once uploaded and after an hypothesis of 
identity begins to form, that genetic data would begin to attract privacy protection. 
There would almost certainly be an obligation on law enforcement to remove the profile 
from any public database as soon as the donor of that genetic material was reasonably 
identifiable.  
While the legal risk here would appear low, it must be remembered that the 
process can be two-way and there is potential for others to make a family connection to 
the uploaded crime scene profile. 
It is possible that a suspect could upload their own genetic data (either because 
they are coincidentally an avid family historian, or for more sinister counter-intelligence 
purposes). In such a case, depending on how the site operates, they may receive e-mail 
notification of a new sibling – a twin, in fact - as law enforcement uploads the relevant 
crime scene data.  Operational security is therefore a relevant factor. 
Notwithstanding some degree of risk, recent successes in the application of 
forensic genetic genealogy will attract the attention of law enforcement 28. In fact, a bill 
passed in May 2018 by the United States Congress specifically quarantines a portion of 
funding for so-called DNA cold case investigations 29. It will be interesting to see for 
how long the capability can be readily exploited. The platform used in several of these 
case studies is a non-profit genetic database of fewer than a million profiles 30. Open 
source and public genealogy platforms would struggle to exclude law enforcement (or 
anyone else with an interest in identifying someone for non-genealogy purposes) while 
still allowing their users the flexibility to transfer and freely upload their own genetic 
information.  
But some commentators have noted that their very existence is fickle. One noted 
the compliance burden of the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation, 
with its commencement perhaps serving – at least in part – as a catalyst for several 
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smaller platforms to close down in recent months 31. This may see the migration of 
genetic data to major commercial providers, less accessible to law enforcement. 
The use of forensic genealogy brings us closer to a point where it may be 
possible – given enough data and resources – to identify any genetic sample. 
Crowdsourcing and crowdfunding means this technique is available to all. 
Achieving an approach that is privacy compliant, balanced and effective is 
essential to maintaining public trust and minimising potential harm. Otherwise 
individuals who, having parted with $99 and a small vial of saliva, may suddenly find 
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